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DRAFT 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Peter Byrne 
DATE: August 25, 1980 
RE: A-179, Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien 
Children v. Texas, et al. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, staying 
pending appeal an injunction entered by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district 
court held that ~ 21.031 of 
prohibits the use of la } state 
{-
the Texas Education Code, which 
-s;-
fund to educate alien children who 
I\ 
are not "legally admittted" to the United States, violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court 
enjoined state education officials from denying free public 
education to any child .> otherwise eligibl ? due to 
immigration status. The district court denied 
the 
the 
child's 
State of 
2. 
Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because the court found 
t hat a stay "would substantially harm the plaintiffs and would 
not be in the public interest." The court 
,:::: 
of appeals, upon -
subsequent mot ion of the State, stayed the in :i unction pend inq 
appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of 
school-age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denie~ 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and their 
parents. Precise calculation of the number of children in Texas 
encompassed by this description is . -~ 1mposs1 e, the State -
estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
district court rejected this figure as "untenable" and accepted 
a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. These undocumented 
children have not beeen legally admitted to the Uni tea States 
. .A.A,... 
through established channels of immigration. None, however, r 
presently the subject of deportation proceedings, and many, the 
district -... court found, are not deport able under federal 
immigration laws. The ~ i strict court concluded that "the great 
majority of the unnocumented children 
permanent residents of this country." 
are or will become 
This case came before the district court as a result - -- -
of a consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litiation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in 
Texas against the State and 
challenging the val id i ty of § 
- ~ -..-.i..-..-,n-1;;:-....i-i- ~-¥- The court 
state education officials 
~~~ ~ A-~ 
UH only statute o--fi- its 
f\ ~ , 2 t. ,D?,, I 
f o u n a that f-t- e ---s-t-e-oo.t e 
~~f~ 
effectively denied an education to the 
~]though they could attend school upon payment of tuition,~ F.hes.e 
families. Tfie coat ~ l d 
--~· 
beyon~ the means of their 
/1 
that the equal protection clause applies to a]l people residing 
in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It recognized 
that no precedent of 
and,therefor~ relied 
directly supports this ruling, 
'~~' 
1 rulings of this Court, see, 
e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (due process 
clause applies to a l iens unlawfully residing in the United 
States), and precedents in lower courts, see Balanos v. Kiley, 
509 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1975)(dictum). In addition, the 
court found guidance in the language of the equal protection 
clause, which extends protection to persons within a state's 
jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which purports to act 
on any person residing within the state is subject to scrutiny 
under the clause. 
The district court then determined that the Texas - -
statute w~as subject to strict because it impaired a 
fundamental right of access to existing public education. It 
sought to distinguish San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973), which held that the Constitution does not protect 
a right to education, at least beyond training in the basic 
skills necesssary for the exercise of other fundamental rights 
such as voting and free expresssion. Id. at 29-39. The li-4 ~ et 
court observed that§ 21.031 established a complete bar to any 
education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
:J+ 
4. 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is a fundamental 
right under the Constitution to minimal education. It stressed 
that an affirmative answer to this question would not involve 
the federal courts in overseeing the quality of education 
off J,ered by the states, an i nvol vemen t condemned in Rodriguez. 
Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the statute violative 
of the equal protection clause because it was not iustified by a 
compelling state intrerest. While not explicitly so ho l ding, the -
C"'Our.t also implied that it would hold the statute 
unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis scrutiny or 
merely required that the law be substantially related to an 
important state interest. 
II. 
"The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is 
well settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U.S. 1307, 1310 
(1976)(Marshall, J., in chambers). See Meredith v. Fair, 83 
S.Ct. 10, 9 L.Ed.2d 43 (1962)(Black, J., in chambers). The well-
established principles that guide a Circuit Justice in 
considering an application to stay a iudgment entered below are 
equally applicable when considering an application to vacate a 
stay. 
[T)here must be a reasonable probability that 
four members of the Court would consider the 
underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the 
grant of certiorari or the notation of probable 
jurisdiction; there must be a significant 
possibiltiy of reversal of the lower court's 
decision; and there must be a likelihood that 
5. 
irreparable harm will result if that decision is 
not stayed. 
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 
1305 (1974)(Powell, J., in chambers). When an application to 
vacate a stay is considered, this formulation must be modified, 
of course: there must be a significant possibility that a 
majority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
d i St r i C 1 o Ur t I S de Ci Si On • ,. ti'~ ic /.. ~)1..Jt. .. ,._ qU-ftJt rt,-/f...,~,.J -~ 
~5( ~ ictates , thaft"the power to dissolve (. stay.) 
hf~~-~) 
entered prior to adjudication /\-/'&¥- tho .go1::u : t ~ apf)'~ S be 
~~' , 
exercised r~. A Circuit Justice should not disturb, "except 
,0 
upon the weightiest consider at ions, interim determinations of 
the Court of Appeals in matters pending before it." O'Rourke v. 
Levine, 80 S.Ct. 623, 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 615, 616 (1960) (Harlan, J., 
in chambers). The reasons 
interim orders are plain: 
ruleo on the merits of a 
supportin~ this reluctance to overturn 
~ 
when~ court of appeals has not yet 
A 
controversy, the vacation of an interim 
$ 
order ~ ss_.t.a.oe-"l:;t in v ad ~ the nor ma l res pons i b i l i t y ~ 
~f that court- ~o P\ovide fo~ the orderly disposition of cases on _;:;_ 
1 ts docket• a A el=4ffl:t.S t be.....ha-9-e-d , t:o- a~ g ~ a b er -d eg M'! e th an- us ua-1 , ~ 2-_ 
i-r-t~n«-o-,;:re-~ r-.-i.-..1:,,d.- be 
me--r:-.Lts in thi-s Cour~. Unless there is a 
reasonable probability t~ that the case will eventually .come 
before ~ Court for plenary consideration, a Circuit Justice's 
It 
interference with an interim order of ~ -e court of appeals 
cannot be justified solely because he disagrees about the harm a 
party may suffer. The applicants therefore, bear an 
Rider A - page 6 
The District Court's holding that the equal 
q 
protection clause applied to unlawful aliens ,, ,, 
raises a difficult question of constitutional 
significance. It also involves a pressing 
national problem, as aliens enter our country in 
increasing numbers. In more immediate terms, the 
case presents a challenge to the administration 
of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals may resolve satisfactorily the immediate 
question. But the overarching question of the 
application of the equal protection clause to 
,, f " 
unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
Dl~ 
6. 
augmented burden of showing both that the failure to vacate the 
stay [wils probabi°y )...cause them irreparable harm and that the 
Court C!ll ---eventually eitheri grant certioari or note probable 
jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even 
before decision by the court of appeals, that there is a .. -- -
reasonable probability~ that th~ Court will ~ tlM"'TY grant 
~ ~ ~ \ 
certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. , district 
-::: 
s.,igRi~ challenge to the administration of Texas 
schools of ~ ~ eM impotance to the State's residents. 
decision of the s ourt of ~ppeals may f atisfactor""fi) ;;;;solv;t;h 
immediate question, ~ hlfuL .UU,_t it can- set.JI'..,'\ the 
..4.r--,-t. ;,...,... 'k-~(-
overarching question of the 
unlawful 
It is more difficult to 
~~rbi l i ~ at a majority significant 
o f the ~ clause to 
~ ... 'IIIA-W ,r 1 
~o ~ op o'f 
say ~ re is a 
of J:i:t'rourt eventually 
"' 
wilJ ~ gree ~ th the _ii strict _:our~ s decision. J he opinion 
he court of appeals will bear heavily on our deliberations. ) - . ,. 
Furthermore, the a i strict court g,-l ib-Q.£ M ~ Y has expanded the ... - , { ,,-. -
boundaries of constitutional concern. Reasonable minds may 
differ over the correctness of the court's ruling that unlawful 
-----------
li 
~ 
/7 
Rider - page 7 
-Thus, while not finding direct support in our 
precedents, the court concluded that these 
holdings are consistent with established 
constitutional principles. 
tfl~ 
Although the question is close, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that five members of the Court 
may agree with the holding of the District Court. 
This is not to suggest that I have reached any 
decision on the merits of this case or that I think it 
~ 
more probable than not that ~he €on& will agree with " -
the District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the 
~ /ourt's decision is reasoned, that it presents novel 
and important issues, and is supported by considera-
tions that may be persuasive to the Court of Appeals 
or to this Court. Further, it may be possible to 
accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its analysis. 
~ 
<-I: 
f 
7. 
are pro t ected by an equal protection clause tlfa 
chi l dren a right to a minimal level of 
I , 
free~ ,] 1 c 
cation. 
/ Matthews v. Diaz, supra, upheld the power of the 
federal government to make distinctions between classes of 
aliens in the provision of Medicare benefits against a claim 
that the classification violated the due process clause. The 
Court's resolution of the case rested, however, on Congress's 
necessarily broad power over all aspects of immigration and 
naturalization, and we specif/ ically stated that "equal 
protection analysis involves significantly different 
considerations because it concerns the relationship between 
aliens and the states rather than between aliens and the Federal 
Government." 426 U.S. at 84-85. The district court relied 
;;:::.. 
explicitly on this distinction in holding that the equal 
protection clause applies to the State's treatment of unlawful 
aliens. Likewise, as mentioned above, the court relied on a 
reservation in San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to 
find room for 
to a minimal level of free e-e-eh Of 
~ not finding 
c~l g ..f .i.n4... --a... 
~ 
cq,Rst-i tu-tiona' aJlP-: 
~ ough 
i Sr•a- .. sj,,g.o i f i ca 
tf 
,f_ ~ ~. i ·;. +v ~ 
~. k441,.,.(J'/4 
he quest ion is close, l\~ on ~l,J.i~tha,t t het.e.. 
that five members of the Court ~~ 
C C,vz<,4- , , ,, n· ~"'"'" ~ · 1-1 ..... 7 -·H, c:o£- :J:) 
~ ·';~1'.. A,0.~~ 
/L~ 7 /~ 
aqree with 
-;::;., 
of-lllY-Pr..edi,c.t,.ion. oc WA.a-~ he Court 
t ~ . o.t , indicate my own 
8. 
Th-i,..s- for-mu~ a~ion 
a"t some point- in 
the merits of this 
case ? or a~es -i t=M\gi e a e e that I think it more probable than not 
that the Court will agree with the district court . Rather , it 
. h h . . ' d. . . . ~~ '-ta ~ ~ .... ,i_,,.,.~ . 
recognizes tat t e ~courts ec1s1on 1s reasone / .,_.-
...._ • I'( 
...... . ~) 
au-t hor · y, and is supported by 
considerations that may be persuasive ~~,u.r.-¥"~ t ~ some ~mebe:r=- s.- ~ - ~ 
Court. 
court• s 
-:::,...; 
Q e-o w:..t-4.. 
Further, 
' decision 
it may be possible to accept the district 
without fully embracinq the full sweep-=:of ~ 
a nalysi:J- . 
~1~ ~ 
P.J..a int i ·f rs have presented con vi nc ing arguments that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vac,gated. 
The district court, having before it the voluminous evidence ... ... 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probable harm 
to plaintiffs in denying the State's motion to stay the 
injunction . Undocumented alien children have not been able to 
attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute was 
enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by lack of 
education needs little elucidation . & : only ar:ethe;if children 
consigned to ignorance and illiteracy~; ~ they ~~ denied the 
end-,---aoci.aJ. i~zi ~ 1;'-~~f asso~iation in the 
-~ classroom w1 th/\ students .._ af a~-s.e Am 
t..:1-....c-"- :. J ~ 
In stead, most ' or---the children 
- a.a kq,r o uuds • 
~~i-d~.ee-s 
i'c 
k-4 
--
9. 
a 
lead to emotional 
and behavioral problems. These observations ~ supported by the 
district court's findings about the condition of the chjldren in 
,- .. -question. ~,/-~ .hJ ~ f1c,. 
The works minimal harm on 
plaintiffs bec\3-use they have been out of school for five years 
and absence needed to a.~eri:-tattv?ly 
settle this controversy wil-i~ not - add further irreparable h~ 
T if the stay is not 
each child will have wasted a year of his or her . life 
could have been spent profitably in school. Second, 
idleness doubtless will lead some of these children 
difficulties with legal authorities that will adversely 
:E-utu'r~-s. F in_al l .t, i xpert testimony pre sen tea at --trial indicates that delay in entering school will tend to 
exacerbate the deprivations al ready suffered and mi t iqate the 
efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be deemed 
appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas 
Education Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. 
The primary involvement of the State and the Agency is to 
provide state funds to local, independent school districts. See 
generally San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 
l)iu-F ~ 5 -/2.;t[ 
at 6-17. ~ \ does; ~ allege that it will be compelled to 
~ 
~' 1 
thA.. 
~ 
'i ~ 
4 
/1 furnish , additional funds for the upcoming school year . ~ 
/'( a.~ J (,, f 
1
submits that its total expenditure will be "diluted" by $70 per 
Rider - page 8 
Not only are the children consigned to ignorance and 
illiteracy; they also are denied the benefits of 
association in the classroom with American students. 
Instead, it is said that most of the children remain 
idle, or are subjected prematurnto physical toil, 
~ 
conditions that may lead to emotional and behavioral 
problems. These observations appear to be supported 
by tJ:ie 'fli.s-:t:. ~ about the condition 
of the children in question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal 
~ .. 4 ' 
harm on ~ s because they have been out of 
A 
school for five years .. a nr;; absence for the additional 
•• 
year needed to settle this controversy will not add 
further irreparable harm. It seems to me that this 
argument is meritless on its face. 
' 
rf(,~ 
ft 
1 0. 
pupil by the addition of the new students. Certainly, this 
decrease in _Eer pupil ex. penditure 
~d4..r~ 
from a current figure of 
$1,200 is /\tr ~ i-J.9~..t-Ae - buree-~~ i s--d~ca s. 
., 
must be borne primarily by the independent school districts, 
~ manage the burdens of educating additional students. 
necessary 
The core of the State's argument is that the stay was 
to avoid irreparable harm ~ the independent school 
districts. It contends that the influx of new Spanish-speaking 
students will strain the abilities of the districts to provide 
bilingual educat~t~ / :;i(~;;r rai ~ tricts to a , 
possible cut-off of federal funds, ~ ~ ~ ";:~ 
:i l.tdici::a].:: ~eci:__ee w.h i:£!!: :wa y::- be ~nt £ ;jan_ another pending case ~ 
...... , , , s tt-i-t:-s---c-har g i 11 q v-i-e-l-a-t-i-G-n aws 
in bilingual clas 
ubstantial harm if the probabilit 
ccuraance were ~ubstantial. The papers submitted by the 
/ 
however, show them t 
fund termination has 
decrees pertaining 
no more than h~po thetical. No 
/ 
threatened, no 
/ 
alone violated, and no sm ts have 
alleging violations/4 r state law. 
issued, let 
or threatened 
danger 
Y would 
in the 
to the quality of edu~ ion they 
students in the coming year The admission of 
numbers of illiterate, solely S2anish-speakinq childrenA~tax 
the resources cH1 d i ~ ~~hooJ. district . ~
(\ 
~ ~~~~~~~ 
'F~Hc.L-~d~~~~ 
~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~~ 
~ ,, ~~ n......_ ~-
11. 
urden would fall unequally on the different Texas school 
istricts, depending on the number of chi l dren locally to be 
and the resources available. The affadavits 
submitted to the court of ~ppealsp , 
document the possibility of severe stress only in the Houston 
Independent School District. Affadavits submitted by the 
applicants indicate that many school districts ~re prepared to 
aJ ccept the undocumented children and do not foresee that their 
assimilation will unduly strain their abilities to provide 
~ g~ ation to all their pupils. 
~ 
Under these circumstances, I conclude that ~ 
the balance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the chi~dren ~ ol 
)I\ 
districts where s.erious stra i n -eft the ability of the local 
t-viLt ~ ~. 
schools to provide education Aaee,s not~ threatenA The stay 
instituted by the court of appeals, which applies to all school 
-:::,..__ 
districts within Texas, is vacated. This order shall be without 
prejudice to the ability of an individual school district, or 
the State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the a i strict 
court's iniunction. If the district can demonstrate that, 
because of the number of undocumented alien children within its 
jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited resources, the 
iJWll@dia~~ operation of the iniunction would severely hamper the 
provision of education to all its students during the coming 
year, the granting of a stay would be iustified. 
K'/z r I J 0 
CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi 
No. A-179 
Certain Named and Unnamed Non-
Citizen Children and Their 
Parents, Applicants, 
v. 
State of Texas et al. 
On Application to Vacate 
Stay. 
[September-, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, staying pending 
appeal an injunction entered by the United States District 
Court ' for the Southern District of Texas. The District 
Court held that § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, which 
prohibits the use of state funds to educate alien children who, 
are not "legally admitted" to ·the United States, violates the. 
Equal Protection , Clause· of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
The Court enjoined state education officials from denying 
free public education to any child, otherwise eligible, due to 
the child's immigration status. The District Court denied 
the State of Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because 
the Court found that a stay "would substantially harm the 
plaintiffs and would not be in the public interest." The 
Court of Appeals, upon subsequent motion of the State, 
stayed the injunction pending appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of school-
age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denied 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and their 
1 Another Federal District Court in Texas had previously held that 
§ 21.031 violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Tyler 
Independent School District. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 
1978), appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (CA5). 
2 NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 
parents.2 Precise calculation of the number of children in 
Texas encompassed by this description is impossible. The 
State estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
District Court rejected this figure as "untenable" and ac-
cepted a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. These 
undocumented children have not been lega.Ily admitted to the 
United States through established channels of immigration. 
None, however, is presently the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings, and many, the District Court found, are not de-
portable under federal immigration laws. The District Court 
concluded that "the great majority of the undocumented 
children ... are or will become permanent residents of this 
country." 
This case came before the District Court as a result of a 
consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in Texas 
against the State a.nd state education officials challenging the 
validity of § 21.031. No other State has a similar statute. 
The Court found that § 21.031 effectively denied an educa-
t~on to the plaintiff children. Although they could attend 
school upon payment of tuition, the Court further found 
that such payment is beyond the means of their families. 
It held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all people 
residing in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It 
recognized that no precedent of this Court directly supports 
this ruling, and, therefore, relied on analogous rulings of this 
Court, see, e. g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(Due Process Clause applies to aliens unlawfully residing in 
the United States) , and precedents in lower courts, see 
Balanos v. Kiley, 509 F. 2d 1023, 1025 (CA2 1975) (dictum), 
In addition, the Court found guidance in the language of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which extends protection to persons 
within a State's jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which 
purports to act on a.ny person residing within the State is 
subject to scrutiny under the clause. 
2 The United States inwrvened on the side of plaintiffs below and has 
filed here a statement in support of the application to vacate the stay. 
NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 3 
The District Court then determined that the Texas statute 
was subject to strict scrutiny because it impaired a funda-
mental right of access to existing public education. It sought 
to distinguish San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 1 (1973), which held that the Constitution does not 
protect a right to education, at least beyond training in the 
basic skills necessary for the exercise of other fundamental 
rights such as voting and free expression. Id., at 29-39. The 
Court observed that § 21.031 established a complete bar to 
any education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is a funda-
mental right under the Constitution to minimal education. 
It stressed that an affirmative answer to this question woulcf 
not involve the federal courts in overseeing the quality of 
education offered by the States, an involvement condemned in 
Rodriguez. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held tlie 
statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was not justified by a compelling state interest. While not 
explicitly so holding, the Court also implied that it would hold' 
the statute unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis 
scrutiny or merely required that the law be substantially 
related to an important state interest. 
II 
"The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is well 
settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., in chambers). See Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 
10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) ( Black, J., in chambers). The 
well-established principles that guide a Circuit Justice in 
considering an application t-0 stay a judgment entered below 
are equally applicable when considering an application to 
vacate a stay. 
"[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
members of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant for certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's 
4 NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 
decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable 
harm will result if that decision is not stayed." 
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U. S. 
1301, 1305 (1974) (POWELL, J., in chambers). When an ap-
plication to vacate a stay is considered, this formulation must 
be modified, of course: there must be a significant possibility 
that a majority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
District Court's decision. 
Respect for the judgment of the Court of Appeals dictates 
that the power to dissolve its stay, entered prior to ajudica-
tion of the merits, be exercised with restraint. A Circuit 
Justice should not disturb, "except upon the weightiest con-
sidera:tions, interim determinations of the Court of Appeals 
in matters pending before it." O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 
623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615,616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers). 
The reasons supporting this reluctance to overturn interim 
orders are plain: when a court of appeals has not yet ruled 
on the merits of a controversy, the vacation of an interim 
order invades the n<;>rmal responsibility of that Court to 
provide for the orderly disposition of cases on its ·docket. 
Unless there is a reasonable probability that the case will 
eventually come before this Court for plenary consideration, 
a Circuit Justice's interference with an interim order of a 
court of appeals cannot be justified solely because he dis-
agrees about the harm a party may suffer. The applicants, 
· therefore, bear an augumented burden of showing both that 
· the failure to vacate the stay probably will cause them 
irreparable harm and that the Court eventually either will 
grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even before 
decision by the Court of Appea.ls, that there is a reasonable 
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note 
probable jurisdiction. The District Court's holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to unlawful aliens raises a 
difficult question of constitutional significance. It also in-
volves a pressing national problem: the number of unlawful 
alien residing in our country has risen dramatically. In more 
NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 5 
immediate terms, the case presents a challenge to the ad-
ministration of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of Appeals may 
resolve satisfactorily the immediate question. But the over-
arching question of the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
It is more difficult to say whether there is a significant 
probability that a majority of this Court eventually will agree 
with the District Court's decision. Matthews v. Diaz, supra, 
upheld the power of the Federal Government to make distinc-
tions between classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare 
benefits against a claim that the classification violated the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's resolution of the case 
rested, however, on Congress's necessarily broad power over 
all aspects of immigration and naturalization, and we spe-
cifically stated that "equal protection analysis ... involves 
significantly different considerations because it concerns the 
relationship between aliens and the states rather than between 
aliens and the Federal Government." 426 U. S., at 84-85. 
The District Court relied explicitly on this distinction in 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the 
State's treatment of unlawful aliens. Likewise, as mentioned 
above, the court relied on a reservation in San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that 
there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free 
public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in 
our precedents, the Court concluded that these holdings are 
consistent with established constitutional principles. 
Although the question is close, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that five Members of the Court may agree with the 
holding of the District Court. This is not to suggest that I 
have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that 
I think it more probable than not that we will agree with the 
District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the Court's de-
cision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important issues, 
and is supported by considerations that may be persuasive 
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Further, it may be 
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possible to accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its analysis. 
III 
Applicants also have presented convincing arguments that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vacated. 
The District Court, having before it the voluminous evidence 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probable harm 
to plaintiffs in denying the State's motion to stay the in-
junction. Undocumented alien children have not been able 
to attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute 
was enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by lack 
of education needs little elucidation. Not only are the chil-
dren consigned to ignorance and illiteracy; they . also are 
denied the benefits of association in the classroom with stu-
dents and teachers of diverse backgrounds. Instead, most 
of the children remain idle, or are subjected prematurely ,to 
physical toil, conditions that may lead to emotional and be-
- . 
·havioral problems. · These observations appear to be sup-
ported by findings about the condition of the children in 
question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal harm on 
applicants because they have been out of s~hoo1 for 5 years. 
"Absence for the additional year needed to settle this contro-
versy will not add further irreparable harm. It seems to 
me that this argument is meritless on its face. Expert testi-
. mony presented at trial indicates that delay in entering school 
will tend to exacerbate the deprivations already suffered and 
mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be 
-deemed appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas Education 
· Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. The 
primary involvement of the State and the Agency is to pro-
vide state funds to local, independent school districts. See 
generally San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 
U. S., at 6-17. Nor does the State allege that it will be 
compelled to furnish additional funds for the upcoming school 
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year. Rather, it submits that its total expenditure will be 
"diluted" by $70 per pupil by the addition of the new stu-
dents. Certainly, this decrease in per pupil expenditure from 
a current figure of $1,200 is not de minimus. The core of 
the State's argument is that the stay was necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm to the independent school districts. It con-
tends that the influx of new Spanish-speaking students will 
strain the abilities of the districts to provide bilingual educa-
tion, and thus cause the districts to violate existing or pend-
ing rules governing the provision of bilingual education. 
These legal difficulties seem speculative. Perhaps the greater 
danger is that the quality of education in some districts 
would suffer during the coming year. 
The admission of numbers of illiterate, solely Spanish-
speaking children may tax the resources of a school dis-
trict. The affidavits submitted to the Court of Appeals 
document the possibility of severe stress only in the Houston 
Independent School District.3 Affidavits submitted by the 
applicants indicate that many school districts are prepared 
to accept the undocumented children and do not foresee that 
their assimilation will unduly strain their abilites to provide 
a customary education to all their pupils. 
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the ha.lance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the children, certainly in 
those school districts where the ability of the local schools to 
provide education will not be threatened. The stay instituted 
by the Court of Appeals, which applies to all school districts 
within Texas, is vacated.. This order shall be without prej-
udice to the ability of an individual school district, or the 
State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the district court's 
injunction. If the district can demonstrate that, because of 
the number of undocumented alien children within its juris-
diction or because of exceptionally limited resources, the op-
eration of the injunction would severely hamper the provision 
3 The State argues that serious difficulties can be expected in the Dallas 
and Brownsville school districts as well. 
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of education to all its students during the coming year, the 
granting of a stay would be justified.4 
4 
Applicants indicate that the District Court already has expressed a 
willingness to consider staying its injunction in those school districts that 
can demonstrate exceptional difficulty in admitting the children this fall. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I enclose a draft of a proposed Chambers Opinion by 
me as Circuit Justice and the most pertinent papers in the 
case. This is the Texas case that has received considerable 
public attention. It involves the validity of the Texas 
statute that prohibits the use of state funds to educate 
alien childen who are not "legally admitted" to the United 
States. Suits were filed in all federal districts in Texas, 
and these were consolidated for trial in the Southern 
District of Texas. 
The District Judge there held that the statute 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, and enjoined the 
enforcement of the statute. The Court denied the State's 
motion to stay its injunction, but the Court of Appeals 
granted a stay at the State's request. 
For the reasons stated in my draft opinion, I am 
inclined to vacate the stay and allow the injunction to 
remain in effect pending appeal to the Court of Appeals. The 
constitutional question is a close one, and normally I would 
not interfere with the action of the Court of Appeals. In 
this case, however, it seems to me that the balance of 
irreparable injury is overwhelmingly on the side of children 
who already have been denied public education for several 
years. 
Before releasing an opinion, however, I would like 
to have the views of Justices who may be available this week. 
I would prefer to refer this to the Conference. But the 
Chief Justice and others may not return until next week. 
In sum, I would like your views as to whether: (1) 
we should hold this until a quorum is present for a 
Conference, or (2) I should act as Circuit Justice and enter 
the order indicated by my draft opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. A-179 
Certain ~amed and Unnamed Non-
Citizen Children and Their 
Parents, Applicants, 
v. 
State of Texas et al. 
On Application to Vacate 
Stay. 
[September -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, staying pending 
appeal an injunction entered by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District 
Court held that § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, which 
prohibits the use of state funds to educate alien children who 
are not "legally admitted" to the United States, viplates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm~nt.1 
The Court enjoined state education officials from denying 
free public education to any child, otherwise eligible, due to 
the child's immigration status. The District Court denied 
the State of Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because 
the Court found that a stay "would substantially harm the 
plaintiffs and would not be in the public interest." The 
Court of . Appeals, upon subsequent motion of the State, 
~tayecl the injunction pending appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of school-
age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denied 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and their 
1 Another Federal District Court in Texas had previously held that 
§ 21.031 violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Tyler 
Inde.rendent School District. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 
1978), appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (CA5). · 
2 NAMED AND UNNAMED CHiLDREN v. TEXAS 
parents.2 Precise calculation of the number of children in 
Texas encompassed by this description is impossible. The 
State estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
District Court rejected this figure as "untenable" and ac-
cepted a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. · These 
undocumented children have not been legally admitted to the 
United States through established channels of immigration. 
None, however, is presently the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings, and many, the District Court found. are not de-
portable under federal immigration laws. The District Court 
concluded 'that "the great majority of the undocumented 
children ... are or will become permanent residents of this 
country." 
This case came before the District Court as a result of a 
consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in: Texas 
against the State ai~d state education officials ·challenging the 
validity of § 21.031. No other State has a similar sta.tute. 
The Court found that § 21.031 effectively ·denied an educa, 
tion to the plaintiff children. Althougl1 they could attend 
school upon payment of tuition , the Court further found 
that such payment is beyond the means of their families. 
It held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all people 
residing in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It 
recognized that no precedent of this Court directly supports 
this ruling, and, therefore, relied on analogous rulings of this 
Court, see, e.. g., Jvlatthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(Due Process Clause applies to aliens unlawfully residing in 
the United States) , and precedents in lower courts, see 
Balanos v. Kiley, 509 F. 2d 1023, 1025 (CA2 1975) (dictum) , 
In addition, the Court found guidance in the language of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which extends protection to persons 
within a State's jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which 
purports to act on any person residing within the State is 
subject to scrutiny under the clause. 
2 The United States intervened on the side of plaintiffs below and has 
fileci:liere a sta tement in .support of the application to vacate the .stay. 
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The District Court then determined that the 'fexas statute 
was subject to strict scrutiny because it impaired a funda-
mental right of access to existing public education. It sought 
to distinguish San Antonio School Board v. Rodrigue~, 411 
U. S. 1 (1973), which held that the Constitution does not 
protect a right to education, at least beyond training in the 
basic skills necessary for the exercise of other fund~mental 
rights such as voting and free expression. Id., at 29-39. The 
Court observed tha.t § 21.031 established a complete bar to 
any education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is a ~uncla-
mental right under the Constitution to minimal education. 
It stressed that an affirmative answer to this question would 
not involve the federal courts in overseeing the quality of 
education offered by the States, an involvement condemned in 
Rodriguez. ,Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the 
statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because' it 
wa.s not justified by a compelling state interest. While npt 
explicitly so holding, the Court also implied that it would hold 
the stat4te unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis 
scrutiny or merely required that the law be substantially 
related to an important state interest. 
II 
"The power of a Circu.it Justice to dissolve a stay is well 
settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J ., in chambers). See Meredith v. Fair, 83 S, Ct. 
10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) ( Black, J ., in chambers) . The 
well-established principles that guide a G;rcuit Justice in 
considering an application to stay a judgment entered belqw 
are equally applicable when considering an application to 
vacate a stay. 
" [T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
members of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of · reversal of the lower cpurt's 
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µ~cision; and there must be a likelihood that irrepara.bJe 
harm win result if that decision is not stayed." 
ffimes-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkarnp, 419 U. S: 
1301, 1305 (1974) (POWELL, J., in chambers). When an ap-
plication to 'vac~te a stay is considered, this formulation mqs~ 
be modified, of course: there must be a significant possibility 
t,hat a majority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
District Court's d,ecision. 
Respect for the judgment of the Court of Appeals dictates 
that the power to dissolve its stay, entered prior to ajudic1:1,-
tion of the merits, be exercised with restraint. A Circuit 
Justice should not disturb, "except upon the wrightiest co11-
siderations, interim determinatious of the Court of Appealf! 
in matters pending before it." O' Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 
623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615,616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers). 
The reasons supporting this reluctance to overturn interim 
orders are plain: when a court of appeals has not yet ruled 
on the merits of a controversy, the vacation of an interim 
order inyades the norm~I responsibility of that court to 
provide for the orderly disposition (?'f cases o.n its docket. 
Unless there is a reasonable probability that the case will 
eventually come before this Court for plenary consideration, 
a Circuit Justice's interference with an interim order of a 
court of appeals cannot be justified solely because he dis-
agrees about the harm a party may suffer. The applicants, 
therefore, bear an augmnented burden of showing both th4t 
the failure to vacate the stay probably will cause them 
irreparable harm and that the Court eventually either will 
graut certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even before 
decision by the Court of Appeals, that there is a reasonable 
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note 
probable jurisdiction. The District Court's holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to unlawful alie11s raises a 
difficult question of constitutional significance. It also in-
volves a pre~sing national problem: the number of u;1lawful 
alien residing in our country has risen dramatically. In mOI'e 
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immediate terms, the case presents a challenge to the ad-
ministration of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of Appeals may 
resolve satisfactorily the immediate question. But the over-
arching question of the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
It is more difficult to say whether there is a significant 
probability that a ma.jority of this Court eventually will agree 
with the District Court's decision. Matthews v. Diaz, supra~ 
upheld the power of the Federal Government to make distinc-
tions between classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare 
benefits against a claim that the classifica.t.ion violated the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's resolution of the case 
rested, however, on Congress's necessarily broad power over 
all aspects of immigration and uaturalization, and we spe-
cifically statecl that "equal protection ll,nalysis ... involvies 
significantly different considerations because it concerns the 
relationship between aliens and the states rather than between 
aliens and the Federal Government." 426 U. S., at 84-.--85. 
The District Court relied explicitly on this distinction in 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies tq the 
State's treatment of unlawful aliens. Likewise, as mentioned 
above, the court relied on a reservation in San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that 
there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free 
public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in 
our precedents, the Court concluded that these holdings are 
consistent with established constitutional principles. 
Although the question is close, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that five Members of the Court may agree with the 
decision of the Distrkt Court. This is not to suggest that I 
have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that 
I think it more probable than not that we will agree with the 
District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the Court's de-
cision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important issues, 
and is supported by considerations that may be persuasive 
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Further, it may be 
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possible to accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its analysis. 
III 
Applicants also have presented convincing arguments that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vacated. 
The District Court, having before it the voluminous evidence 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probable harm 
to plaintiffs i11 denying the State's motion to st&,y the in-
junction. Undocumented alien children have not been able 
to attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute 
was enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by lack 
of education needs little elucidation. Not only are the chil-
. dren consigned to ignorance and illiteracy; they also are 
denied the benefits of association in the classroom with stu-
dents and teachers of diverse backgrounds. Instead, most 
of the children remain idle, or are subjected prematurely to 
phy~ical toil, conditions that may lead to emotional and be-
havioral problems. · These observations appear to be sup-
ported by findings about the condition of the children in 
question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal harm on 
applicants because they have been out of school for 5 years. 
Absence for the additional year needed to settle this contro-
versy will not add further irreparable harm. It seems to 
· me that this argument is meritless on its face. Expert testi-
mony presented at trial indicates that delay in entering school 
will tend to exacerbate the deprivations already suffered and 
mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be 
deemed appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas Education 
Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. Thr 
primary involvement of the State and the Agency is to pro-
vide state funds to local, independent school dhitricts. See 
generally San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 
U. S., at 6--17. Nor does the State allege that it will be 
compelled to furnish additional funds for the upcoming sGhool 
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year. Rather, it submits that its total expenditure will be 
"diluted" by $70 per pupil by the addition of the new stu-
dents. Certainly, this decrease in per pupil expenditure from 
a current figure of $1,200 is not de minirnus. But the core of 
the State's argument is that the stay was necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm to the independent school districts. It con ... 
tends that the influx of new Spanish-speaking students will 
strain the abilities of the districts to provide bilingual educa-. 
tion, and thus cause the districts to violate existing or pend-
ing rules governing the provision of bilingual education. 
These legal difficulties seem speculative. 
Perhaps the greater danger is that the quality of education 
in some districts would suffer during the coming year. The 
admission of numbers of illiterate, solely Spanish-speaking 
children may tax the resources of a school district. The 
affidavits submitted to the Court of Appeals document the 
possibility of severe stress only in the Houston Independent 
School District.3 Affidavits submitted by the applicants indi-
cate, however, that many school districts are prepared to 
accept the undocumented children and do not foresee that 
their assimilation will unduly strain their abilites to provide 
a customary education to all their pupils. 
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the balance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the children, certainly in 
those school districts where the ability of the local schools to 
provide education will not be threatened. I therefore will 
vacate the stay instituted by the Court of Appeals, which 
applies to all school districts within Texas. This order shall 
be without prejudice to the ability of an individual school 
district, or the State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the 
District Court's injunction. If the district can demonstrate 
that, because of the number of undocumented alien children 
within its jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited 
resources, the operation of the injunction would severely ham-
3 The State argues here, that serious difficulties can be expected in the 
Dallas and Brownsville school districts as welt 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEDRgTAT~ ,., . 
No. A-179 
Certaip Named and Unnamed Non-
Citizen Children and Their 
Parents, Applicants, 
v. 
State of Texas et al. 
On Application to Vacate 
Stay. 
[September II\, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, staying pending 
appeal a.n injunction entered by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District 
Court held that § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, which 
prohibits the use of state funds to educate alien ~hildren who 
are not "legally admitted" to the United States, vi9lates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendnwnt.1 
The Court enjoined state education officials from denying 
free public education to any child, otherwise eligible, due to 
the child's immigration status. The District Court denied 
the State of Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because 
the Court found that a stay "would substantially harm the 
plaintiffs and would not be in the public interest." The 
Court of Appeals, upon subsequent motion of the State, 
stayed the injunction pending appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of school-
age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denied 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and the~r 
1 Another Federal District Court in Texas had previously held that 
§ 21.031 viola.tes the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Tyler 
Independent School District. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 
1978), appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (CA5). 
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parent s.2 Precise calculation of the number of children in 
Texas encompassed by this description is impossible. The 
State estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
District Court rejected this figure as "untenable" and ac-
cepted a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. · These 
undocumented children have not been legally admitted to the 
United States through established channels of immigration. 
None, however, is presently the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings, and many, the District Court found, are not de-
port.able under federal immigration laws. The District Court 
concluded ·that "the great majority of the undocumented 
children ... are or will become permanent residents of this 
country." 
This case came before the District Court as a result of a 
consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in Texas 
against the State and state education officials challenging the 
validity of § 21.031. No other State has a similar statute. 
The Court found that § 21.031 effectively de11ied an educa .. 
tion to the plaintiff children. A1tboug11 they could attend 
school upon payment of tuition, the Court further found 
that such payment is beyond the means of their families. 
It held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all people 
residing in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It 
recognized that no precedent of this Court directly supports 
this ruling, and, therefore, relied on analogous rulings of this 
Court, see, e. g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, ·77 (1976) 
(Due Process Clause applies to aliens unlawfully residing in 
the United States) , and precedents in lower courts, see 
Balanos v. Kiley, 509 F. 2d 1023, 1025 (CA2 1975) (dictum), 
In addition, the Court found guidance in the language of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which extends protection to persons 
within a State's jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which 
purports to act on any person residing within the State is 
subject to scrutiny under the clause. 
2 The United States intervened on the side of plaintiffs below and has 
filect'-liere a sta tement in .support of the ap1)lica t.ion to vacate the .&iay. 
NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 3 
The District Court then determined that the Texas statute 
was subject to strict scrutiny because it impaired a funda-
mental right of access to existing public education. It sought 
to distinguish San Antonio Sclwol Board v. Rodrigue~, 411 
U. S. 1 ( 1973), which held that the Constitution does not 
protect a right to education, at least beyond training in the 
basic skills necessary for the exercise of other fQndl¥nental 
rights such as voting and free expression. Id., at 29-39. The 
Court observed that § 21.031 established a complete bar to 
any education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is ~ funda-
mental right under the Constitution to minimal education. 
It stressed that an affirmative answer to this question would 
not involve the federal courts in overseeing the quality of 
education offered by the States, an involvement condemned in 
Rodriguez. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held ~he 
statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was not justified by a compelling state interest. While not 
explicitly so holding, the Court also implied that it would hold 
the statute unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis 
scrutiny or merely required that the law be substantiall;Y 
related to an important state interest. 
II 
"The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is well 
settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., in chambers). See Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 
10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) ( Black, J., in chambers). The 
well-established principles that guide a Circuit Justice in 
considering an application to stay a judgment entered below 
are equally applicable when considering an application to 
vacate a stay. 
"[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
mem.bers of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of reversal of the low-er court's 
4 ~Mvf:E:D AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 
µ13cision ; and there must be a likelihood that irrepara.bJe 
harm wilJ resuit if that decision is not stayed." 
ffimes-Picayun~ Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkarnp, 419 U. S: 
1301, 1305 p974) (POWELL, J. , in chambers). When an ap-
plication to vacate a stay is considered, this formulation mqst 
be modified, of course: there must be a significant possibility 
that a majority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
District Court's d,ecision. 
Respect for the judgment of the Court of Appeals dictates 
that the power to dissolve its stay, entered prior to ajuclicf!,-
tion of the merits, be exercised with restraint. A Circuit 
Justice should not disturb, "except upon the weightiest con-
siderations, interim . determinati011s of the Court of Appei:i,ls 
in matters pending before it." O'Rourke v. I,,evine, 80 S. Ct. 
623,624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615,616 (1960) (Harlan, J. , in chambers). 
'fhe reasons supporting this reluctance to overturn interim 
orders are plain: when a court of appeals has not yet ruled 
on the merits of a controversy, the vacation of an interim 
order invades the .norma) responsibility of that court to 
provide for the orderly disposition '?f cases on its docket. 
Unless there is a reasonable probability that the case will 
eventually come before this Court for plenary consideration, 
a Circuit Justice's interference with an interim order of a 
court of appeals cannot be justified solely because he dis-
agrees about the harm a party may suffer. The applicants, 
therefore, bear an augumented burden of showing both that 
the failure to vacate the stay probably will cause them 
irreparable harm and that the Court eventually either will 
grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even before 
decision by the Court of Appeals, that there is a reasonable 
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note 
probable jurisdiction. The District Court's holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to unlawful aliells raises a 
difficult question of constitutional significance. It also in-
volves a pressing national problem: the number of uplawful 
alien residing in our country has risen dramatically. In more 
NAMEP AND UNNAMEP eHiLDff,EN v. TEXAS 5 
immediate terms, the case presents a challenge to the ad-
ministration of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of Appeals may 
resolve satisfactorily the immediate question. But the over-
arching question of the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
It is more difficult to say whether there is a significant 
probability that a majority of this Court eventually will agree 
with the District Court's decision. Matthews v. Diaz, supra, 
upheld the power of the Federal Government to make distinc-: 
tions between classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare 
benefits against a claim that the classification violated the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's resolution of the case 
rested, however, on Congress's necessarily broad power over 
all aspects of immigration and naturalization, and we spe-
cifically stated that "equal protection analysis ... involves 
significantly different considerations because it concerns the 
relationship between aliens and the states r~ther than between 
aliens and the Federal Government." 426 U. S., at 84-85. 
The District Court relied explicitly on this distinction in 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause app~ies to the 
State's treatment of unlawful aliens. Likewise, a.s mentioned 
above, the court relied on a reservation in San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that 
there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free 
public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in 
our precedents, the Court concluded that these holdings are 
consistent with established constitutional principles. 
Although the question is close, it is not upreasonable to 
believe that five Members of the Court may agree with the 
decision of the District Court. This is not to suggest that I 
have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that 
I think it more probable than not that we will agree with the 
District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the Court's de-
cision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important issues, 
and is supported by considerations that may be persuasive 
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Further, it may be 
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possible to accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its analysis. 
III 
Applicants also have presented convincing arguments that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vacated. 
The District Court, having before it the voluminous evidence 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probable harm 
to plaintiffs in denying the State's motion to st&,y the in-
junction. Undocumented · alien children have not been able 
to attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute 
was enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by lack 
of education needs little elucidation. Not only are the chil-
. dren consigned to ignorance and illiteracy; they also are 
denied the benefits of association in the classroom with stu-
dents and teachers of diverse backgrom1ds. Instead, most 
of the children remain idle, or are subjected prematurely to 
physical toil, conditions that may lead to emotional and be-
havioral problems.· These observations appear to be sup-
ported by findings about the condition of the children in 
question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal harm on 
applicants because they have been out of school for 5 years. 
Absence for the additional year needed to settle this contro-
versy will pot add further irreparable harm. It seems to 
me that this argument is meritless on its face. Expert testi-
mony presented at trial indicates that delay in entering school 
will tend to exacerbate the deprivations already suffered and 
mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be 
deemed appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas Education 
Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. The 
primary involvement of the State and the ,Agency is to pro-
vide state funds to local, independent school districts. See 
generally San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 
U. S., at 6-17. Nor does the State allege that it will be 
compelled to furnish additional funds for the upcoming sGhool 
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year. Rather, it submits that its total expenditure wi11 be 
"diluted" by $70 per pupil by the addition of the new stu-
dents. Certainly, this decrease in per pupil expenditure from 
a current figure of $1,200 is not de rninirnus. But the core of 
the State's argument is that the stay was necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm t-0 the independent school districts. It con-
tends that the influx of new Spanish-speaking students will 
strain the abilities of the districts to provide bilingual educa .. 
tion , and thus cause the districts to violate existing or pend-
ing rules governing the provision of bilingual education. 
These legal difficulties seem speculative. 
Perhaps the greater danger is that the quality of education 
in some districts would suffer during the coming year. The 
admission of numbers of illiterate, solely Spanish-speaking 
children may tax the resources of a school district. The 
affidavits submitted to the Court of Appeals document the 
possibility of severe stress only in the Houston Independent 
School District.3 Affidavits submitted by the applicants indi-
cate, however, that many school districts are prepared to 
accept the undocumented children and do not foresee that 
their assimilation will unduly strain their ab~lites to provide 
a customary education to all their pupils. 
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the balance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the children, certainly in 
those school districts where the ability of the local schools to 
provide education will not be threatened. I therefore will 
vacate the stay instituted by the Court of Appeals, which 
applies to all school districts within Texas. This order shall 
be without prejudice to the ability of an individual school 
district, or the State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the 
District Court's injunction. If the district can demonstrate 
that, because of the number of undocumented alien children 
within its jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited 
resources, the operation of the injunction would severely ham-
3 The St.ate argues_ her~}.hat ~eri?us difficulties can be expected in the 
Dallas and Browusv11le sf:tool districts as welL 
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CHAMBERS OF 
,jUFtmt <!}iturl of tlft ~h ~_g 
,.a:.,dfi:ngt~ J. QJ. 21lffe~~ 
; 
.JusT,cE wM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. September 2, 1980 
RE: No. A-179 Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen 
Children v. Texas 
Dear Lewis: 
I do not think it is necessary to hold this appli-
cation until a quorum is present for a Conference. I. 
agree with your position as stated in your draft opinion, 
and think that you should enter the order as Circuit 
Justice. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
~JP 
Y)~c.C. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
;§u:prttttt <!Jcurl of tip~~~ ,taus 
~1Ulqmgf01t. ~- <!J. 2.0ffe'!,;l 
Septembe7 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. A-179 - Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen 
Children v . Texas 
I discussed this case with Mr. Justice Blackmun today by 
telephone. He has asked me to advise you that he is content 
to have Mr. Justice Powell act as Circuit Justice in this 
matter. 
, ,:'l /4 ,:% tJ;t-Ev __ 
//; John P. Dean 
l,,r Law Clerk 
to Mr. Justice Blackmun 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
_i 
I 
i 
CHAMBERS QF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:pr tlltt <!Jomt of llt.e ~it ~hrl.eg 
~rur fyingLm. ~. QJ. 2.0ffeJI. ~ 
Septanber 2, 1980 
A-179 Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas 
MEM)RANDUM 'IO THE CCNFERENCE : 
Mr. Justice Stewart has advised me by telephone that while he 
would ordinarily be very reluctant to interfere with a stay pending 
appeal granted by a court of appeals , he believes that Mr . Justice 
Pa,.,iell should act as Circuit Justice and enter the order as indicated 
in his draft opinion . 
Elliot Gerson 
Law Clerk to 
Mr . Justice Stewart 
?-c:-~-~~~~ 
j,uµumt (!Jou.rt of tqt 'J.slttittb j,tattg A: /Jf. 
1l'l,,u;qington. ~. QJ. 2llc?J!.~ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD M ARS H A LL ✓ 
September 3 , 1980 
Re: A- 179 ~ Certain Named and Unnamed Non~ 
Citizen Children v . Texas 
Dear Lewis : 
I am sati sfied to leave the matter with 
you to act as Circuit Justice . I agree with 
your order . 
Mr . Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
S;i..ncerely , 
;/71 
T . M. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 
.:§npumt {!Jcurl of tfyt 'J,\lni±th ;§taftg 
jr~sfrington, iE!. {!J. 2DpJ!.$ 
September 4, 1980 
0 
A-179 Certain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Children 
v. Texas 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
On the basis of the views expressed by Bill 
Brennan; Potter, Thurgood and Harry, I am today entering an 
order vacating the stay of the Court of Appeals in the above 
case. 
This will have the effect of reinstating the 
injunction issued by the District Court subject to the 
qualifications stated in my Chambers opinion. 
The Justices not yet heard from are, I am told, at 
various points in their travels. 
There is some urgency, as the public schools in 
~exas already have opened. 
t-. r iP 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. A-179 
Certain Named and Unnamed Non-
Citizen Children and Their 
Parents, Applicants, 
v. 
State of Texas et al. 
On Application to Vacate 
Sray. 
[September 4, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the United 
Srates Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sraying pending 
appeal an injunction entered by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District 
Court held that § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, which 
prohibits the use of srate funds to educate alien children who 
are not "legally admitted" to the United States, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
The Court enjoined state education officials from denying 
free public education to any child, otherwise eligible, due to 
the child's immigration status. The District Court denied 
the State of Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because 
the Court found that a stay "would substantially harm the 
plaintiffs and would not be in the public interest." The 
Court of Appeals, upon subsequent motion of the State, 
stayed the injunction pending appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of school-
age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denied 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and their 
1 Another Federal District Court in Texas had previously held that 
§ 21.031 violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Tyler 
Independent School District. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 
1978) , appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (CA5) . 
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parents.2 Precise calculation of the number of children in 
Texas encompassed by this description is impossible. The 
State estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
District Court rejected this figure as "untenable" and ac-
cepted a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. These 
undocumented children have not been legally admitted to the 
United States through established channels of immigration. 
None, however, is presently the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings, and many, the District Court found , are not de-
portable under federal immigration laws. The District Court 
concluded that "the great majority of the undocumented 
children ... are or will become permanent residents of this 
country." 
This case came before the District Court as a result of a 
consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in Texas 
against the State and state education officials challenging the 
validity of § 21.031. No other State has a similar statute. 
The Court found that § 21.031 effectively denied an educa-
tion to the plaintiff children. Although they could attend 
school upon payment of tuition, the Court further found 
that such payment is beyond the means of their families. 
It held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all people 
residing in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It 
recognized that no precedent of this Court directly supports 
this ruling, and, therefore, relied on analogous rulings of this 
Court, see, e. g., l'rlatthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(Due Process Clause applies to aliens unlawfully residing in 
the United States), and precedents in lower courts, see 
Balanos v. Kiley, 509 F. 2d 1023, 1025 (CA2 1975) (dictum), 
In addition, the Court found guidance in the language of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which extends protection to persons 
within a State's jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which 
purports to act on any person residing within the State is 
subject to scrutiny under the clause. 
2 The United States intervened on the side of plaintiffs below and has 
filed here a statement in ~upport of the application to vacate the stay. 
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The District Court then determined that the Texas statute 
was subject to strict scrutiny because it impaired a funda-
mental right of access to existing public education. It sought 
to distinguish San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 1 (1973), which held that the Constitution does not 
protect a right to education, at least beyond training in the 
basic skills necessary for the exercise of other fundamental 
rights such as voting and free expression. Id., at 29-39. The 
Court observed that § 21.031 established a complete bar to 
any education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is a funda-
mental right under the Constitution to minimal education. 
It stressed that an affirmative answer to this question would 
not involve the federal courts in overseeing the quality of 
edu9ation offered by the States, an involvement condemned in 
Rodriguez. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the 
statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was not justified by a compelling state interest. While not 
explicitly so holding, the Court also implied that it would hold 
the statute unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis 
scrutiny or merely required that the law be substantially 
related to an important state interest. 
II 
"The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is well 
settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., in chambers). See Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 
10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) ( Black, J., in chambers). The 
well-established principles that guide a Circuit Justice in 
considering an application to stay a judgment entered below 
are equally applicable when considering an application to 
vacate a stay. 
"[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
members of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's 
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decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable 
harm will result if that decision is not stayed." 
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U. S. 
1301, 1305 (1974) (POWELL, J., in chambers). When an ap-
plication to vacate a stay is considered, this formulation must 
be modified, of course: there must be a significant possibility 
that a ma.jority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
District Court's decision. 
Respect for the judgment of the Court of Appeals dictates 
that the power to dissolve its stay, entered prior to ajudica-
tion of the merits, be exercised with restraint. A Circuit 
Justice should not disturb, "except upon the weightiest con-
siderations, interim determinations of the Court of Appeals 
in matters pending before it." O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 
623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615, 616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers). 
The reasons supporting this reluctance to overturn interim 
orders are plain: when a court of appeals has not yet ruled 
on the merits of a controversy, the vacation of an interim 
order invades the normal responsibility of that court to 
provide for the orderly disposition of cases on its docket. 
Unless there is a reasonable probability that the case will 
eventually come before this Court for plenary consideration, 
a Circuit Justice's interference with an interim order of a 
court of appeals cannot be justified solely because he dis-. 
agrees about the harm a party may suffer. The applicants, 
therefore, bear an augumented burden of showing both that 
the failure to vacate the stay probably will cause them 
irreparable harm and that the Court eventually either will 
grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even before 
decision by the Court of Appeals, that there is a reasonable 
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note 
probable jurisdiction. The District Court's holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to unlawful aliens raises a 
difficult question of constitutional significance. It also in-
volves a pressing national problem: the number of unlawful 
alien residing in our country has risen dramatically. In more 
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immediate terms, the case presents a challenge to the ad-
ministration of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of Appeals may 
resolve satisfactorily the immediate question. But the over-
arching question of the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
It is more difficult to say whether there is a significant · 
probability that a majority of this Court eventually will agree 
with the District Court's decision. Matthews v. Diaz, supra, 
upheld the power of the Federal Government to make distinc-
tions between classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare 
benefits against a claim that the classification violated the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's resolution of the case 
rested, however, on Congress's necessarily broad power over 
all aspects of, immigration and naturalization, and we spe- · 
cifically stated that "equal protection analysis ... involves 
significantly different considerations because it concerns the 
relationship between aliens and the states rather than between 
aliens and the Federal Government." 426 U. S., at 84-85. 
The District Court relied explicitly on this distinction in 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the 
State's treatment of unlawful aliens. Likewise, as mentioned 
above, the court relied on a reservation in San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that 
there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free 
public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in 
our precedents, the Court concluded that these holdings are 
consistent with established constitutional principles. 
Although the question is close, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that five Members of the Court may agree with the 
decision of the District Court. This is not to suggest that I 
have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that 
I think it more probable than not that we will agree with the 
District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the Court's d~ 
cision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important issues, 
and is supported by considerations that may be persu&Sive 
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Further; it may be 
6 NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 
possible to accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its ana.lysis. 
III 
Applicants also have present.ed convincing arguments that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vacated. 
The District Court, having before it the voluminous evidence 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probabJe harm 
to plaintiffs in denying the State's motion to stay the in .. 
junction. Undocumented alien children have not been able 
to attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute 
was enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by laek 
of education needs little elucidation. Not only are the· phil-
dren consigned to ignorance and illiteracy; they also . are · 
denied the benefits of association in the classroom w~th stu-
dents and teachers of diverse backgrounds. Instead, most 
of the children remain idle, or are subjected prematurely to 
physical toil, conditions that may le.ad to emotional and be .. 
havioral problems. These observations appear to be sup- · 
ported by findings about the condition of the childr~n in 
question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal harm on 
applicants because they have been out of school fqr 5 years. 
Absence for the additional year needed to settle this contro-
versy will not add further irreparable harm. It seems to 
me that this argument is meritless on its face. Expe11t testi-
mony presented at trial indicates that delay in entering school 
will tend to exacerbate the deprivations already suffered and 
mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually ~·nay be 
deemed appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas Education 
Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. The 
primary involvement of the State and the Agency is to pro-
vide state funds to local, independent school districts. See 
generally San Antonio School Bqard v. Rodriguez, SU'JYl'a, 4Jl · 
·u. S., at 6-17. Nor does the State allege that it will be 
compelled to furnish additional fun<ls for the upcoming school 
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year. Rather, it submits that its total expenditure will be 
"diluted" by $70 per pupil l;>y the addition of the new stu-
dents. Certainly, this decrease in per pupil expenditure from 
a current figure of $1,200 is not de minimus. But the core of 
the State's argument is that the stay w~ necessary to av9id 
irreparable ha.rm to the independent school districts. It con-
tends that the influx of new Spanish-speaking sttJdents will 
strain the abilities of the districts to provide bilingull1 educa-
tion, and thus cause the districts to violate existing or pend .. 
ing rules governing the provision of bilingua.J e~ucation. 
These legal difficulties seem speculative. 
Perhaps the greater danger is that the quality of education 
in some districts would suffer during the coming year. The 
admission of numbers of illiterate, solely Spani~h-speaking 
children may tax the resoijrces of a schqol district. The 
affidavits submitted to the Court of Appeals document the 
possibility of severe stress only in the Houston Inqependent 
School District.3 Affidavits submitted by the applicants indi-
cate, · however, that many school districts are · prepared to 
accept the undocumented children and do npt foresee that 
their assimilation will unduly strain their abilites to provide 
a customary education to all their pupils. 
Under these circumstances, I copclude that the balance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the children, certainly in 
those school districts where the ability of the local schools to 
provide education will not be threatened. I therefore will 
vacate the stay instituted by the Court of Appea.Js, which 
applies to all school districts within Texas. This order shall 
be without prejudice to the ability of an individual school 
district, or th~ State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the 
District Court's injunction. If the district can demonstrate 
that, because of the number of undocumented alien children 
within its jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited 
resources, the operation of the in:junction would severely ham-
8 The State argues here that, serious difficulties can be expected in the 
Dallas and Brownsville school districts as well. 
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per the provision of education to all its students during the 
coming year, the granting of a stay would be justified.1 
4 Applicants indicate that the District Court already has expressed ai 
willingness to consider staying its injunction in those school districts that 
can demonstrate exceptional difficulty in admitting the children this fall. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. A-179 
Certain Named and Unnamed Non-
Citizen Children and Their 
Parents, Applicants, 
v. 
State of Texas et al. 
On Application to Vacate 
Stay. 
[September 4, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application to vacate an order of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, staying pending 
appeal an injunction entered by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District 
Court held that § 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, which 
prohibits the use of state funds to educate alien children who 
are not "legally admitted" to the United States, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
The Court enjoined state education officials from denying 
free public education to any child, otherwise eligible, due to 
the child's immigration status. The District Court denied 
the State of Texas's motion to stay its injunction, because 
the Court found that a stay "would substantially harm the 
plaintiffs and would not be in the public interest." The 
Court of Appeals, upon subsequent motion of the State, 
stayed the injunction pending appeal without opinion. 
Plaintiffs below, and applicants here, are a class of school-
age, "undocumented" alien children, who have been denied 
a free public education by the operation of § 21.031, and their 
1 Another Federal District Court in Texas had previously held that 
§ 21.031 violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Tyler 
Independent School District. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 
1978), appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (CA5) . 
~ 
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parents.2 Precise calculation of the number of children in. 
Texas encompassecl by this description is impossible. The 
State estimates that there are 120,000 such children, but the 
District Court rejectecl this figure as "untenable" and ac-
ceptecl a more modest estimate of 20,000 children. These 
undocumented children have not been legally admitted to the 
United States through established channels of immigration. 
None, however, is presently the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings, and many, the District Court found , are not de-
portable under federal immigration laws. The District Court 
concluded that "the great majority of the undocumented 
children ... are or will become permanent residents of this 
country." 
This case came before the District Court as a result of a 
consolidation, by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, of lawsuits filed in all federal judicial district in Texas 
against the State and state education officials challenging the 
validity of § 21.031. No other State has a similar statute. 
The Court found that § 21.031 effectively denied an educa-
tion to the plaintiff children. Although they could attend 
school upon payment of tuition, the Court further found 
that such payment is beyond the means of their families. 
It held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all people 
residing in the United States, including unlawful aliens. It 
recognized that no precedent of this Court directly supports 
this ruling, and, therefore, relied on analogous rulings of this 
Court, see, e. g. , Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(Due Process Clause applies to aliens unlawfully residi11g in 
the United States), and precedents in lower courts, see 
Balanos v. Kiley, 509 F. 2d 1023, 1025 (CA2 1975) (dictum) , 
In addition, the Court found guidance in the language of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which extends protection to persons 
within a State's jurisdiction, and ruled that a state law which 
purports to act on any person residing within the State is 
subject to scrutiny under the clause. 
2 The United States intervened on the side of plaintiffs below and has 
filed here a statement in .support of the application to vacate the .'ltay. 
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The District Court then determined that the Texas statute 
was subject to strict scrutiny because it impaired a funda-
mental right of access to existing public education. It sought 
to distinguish San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 1 (1973) , which held that the Constitution does not 
protect a right to education, at least beyond training in the 
basic skills necessary for the exercise of other fundamental 
rights such as voting and free expression. Id., at 29-39. The 
Court observed that § 21.031 established a complete bar to 
any education for the plaintiff children, and thus raised the 
question reserved in Rodriguez of whether there is a funda-
mental right under the Constitution to minimal education. 
It stressed that an affirmative answer to this question would 
not involve the federal courts in overseeing the quality of 
education offered by the States, an involvement condemned in 
Rodriguez. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the 
statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was not justified by a compelling state interest. While not 
explicitly so holding, the Court also implied that it would hold 
the statute unconstitutional even if it applied rational basis 
scrutiny or merely required that the law be substantially 
related to an important state interest. 
II 
"The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is well 
settled." New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., in chambers). See llferedith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 
10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) ( Black, J. , in chambers). The 
well-established principles that guide a Circuit Justice in 
considering an application to stay a judgment entered below 
are equally applicable when considering an application to 
vacate a stay. 
"[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
members of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's 
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decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable 
harm will result if that decision is not stayed." 
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U. S. 
1301, 1305 (1974) (POWELL, J., in chambers). When an ap-
plication to vacate a stay is considered, this formulation must 
be modified, of course: there must be a significant possibility 
that a majority of the Court eventually will agree with the 
District Court's decision. 
Respect for the judgment of the Court of Appeals dictates 
that the power to dissolve its stay, entered prior to ajudica-
tion of the merits, be exercised with restraint. A Circuit 
Justice should not disturb, "except upon the weightiest con-
siderations, interim determinations of the Court of Appeals 
in matters pending before it." O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 
623,624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615,616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers). 
The reasons supporting this reluctance to overturn interim 
orders are plain: when a court of appeals has not yet ruled 
on the merits of a controversy, the vacation of an interim 
order invades the normal responsibility of that court to 
provide for the orderly disposition of cases on its docket. 
Unless there is a reasonable probability that the case will 
eventually come before this Court for plenary consideration, 
a Circuit Justice's i:dterference with an interim order of a 
court of appeals cannot be justified solely because he dis-
agrees about the harm a party may suffer. The applicants, 
therefore, bear an augumented burden of showing both that 
the fajlure to vacate the stay probably will cause them 
irreparable harm and that the Court eventually either will 
grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. 
This is the exceptional case where it appears, even before 
decision by the Court of Appeals, that there is a reasonable 
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note 
probable jurisdiction. The District Court's holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to unlawful aliens raises a 
difficult question of constitutional significance. It also in-
volves a pressing national problem: the number of unlawful 
alien residing in our country has risen dramatically. In more 
NAMED AND UNNAMED CHILDREN v. TEXAS 3 
immediate terms, the case presents a challenge to the ad-
ministration of Texas public schools of importance to the 
State's residents. The decision of the Court of Appeals may 
resolve satisfactorily the immediate question. But the over-
arching question of the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to unlawful aliens appears likely to remain. 
It is more difficult to say whether there is a significant 
probability that a majority of this Court eventually will agree 
with the District Court's decision. Matthews v. Diaz, supra, 
upheld the power of the Federal Government to make distinc-
tions between classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare 
benefits against a claim that the classificatfon violated the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's resolution of the case 
rested, however, on Congress's necessarily broad power over 
all aspects of immigration and naturalization, and we spe- . 
cifically stated that "equal protection analysis ... involves 
significantly different considerations because it concerns the 
relationship between aliens and the states rather than between 
aliens and the Federal Government." 426 U. S., at 84-85. 
The District Court relied explicitly on this distinction in 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the 
State's treatment of unlawful aliens. Likewise, as mentioned 
above, the court relied on a reservation in San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that 
there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free 
public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in 
our precedents, the Court concluded that these holdings are 
consistent with established constitutional principles. 
Although the question is close, it is not unreasonable to 
bel.ieve that five Members of the Court may agree with the 
decision of the District Court. This is not to suggest that I 
have reached any decision on the merits of this case or that 
I think it more probable than not that we will agree with the 
District Court. Rather, it recognizes that the Court's de-
cision is reasoned, that it presents novel and important issues, 
and is supported by considerations that may be persuasive 
to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Further; it may be 
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possible to accept the District Court's decision without fully 
embracing the full sweep of its analysis. 
III 
Applicants also have presented convincing argument.s that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not vacated. 
The District Court, having before it the voluminous evidence 
presented during trial, explicitly relied on the probable harm 
to plaintiffs in denying the State's motion to stay the in-
junction. Undocumented alien children have qot been able 
to attend Texas public schools since the challenged statute 
was enacted in 1975. The harm caused these children by la.ck 
of education needs little elucidation. Not only are the chil-
dren consigned to ignorance and illiteracy; they also are 
denied the benefits of association in the classroom with stu-
dents and teachers of diverse backgrounds. Instead, most 
of the children remain idle, or are subjected prematurely to 
physical toil, conditions that may lead to emotio,1al apd be-
havioral problems. These observations appear to be sup-
ported by findings about the condition of the children in 
question. 
The State argues that the stay works minimal harm on 
applicants because they have been out of school for 5 years. 
Absence for the additional year needed to settle this contro-
versy will not add further irreparable harm. It seems to 
me that this argument is meritless on its face. Expert testi• 
mony presented at trial indicates that delay in entering school 
will tend to exacerbate the deprivations already suffered and 
mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be 
deemed appropriate. 
The State does not argue that it or the Texas Education 
Agency will be harmed directly if the stay is vacated. The 
primary involvement of the State and the Agency is to pro-
vide state funds to local, independent school districts. See 
generally San Antonio School Board v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 
U. S., at 6-17. Nor does the State allege that it will be 
compelled to furnish additional funds for the up~oming school 
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year. Rather, it submits that its total expenditure will be 
"diluted" by $70 per pupil by the addition of the new stu,. 
dents. Certainly, this decrease in per pupil expendit4re from 
a current figure of $1,200 is not de minim'«,s. But the core of 
the State's argument is that the stay WW!I n~SStl,ry to avoid 
irreparable ha.rm to the independent school districts. It con-
tends that the influx of new Spanish-spea~ing studfmts .will 
strain the abilities of the districts to provide bilingual educa-
tion , and thus cause the districts to violate existing or pend-
in~ rules governing the provision of bilingual education. 
These legal difficulties seem speculative. 
Perhaps the greater danger is that the quality of educti,tion 
in some districts would suffer during the coming year. The 
admission of numbers of illiterate; solely · Spanish-spe.aking 
children may tax the resources of a school dist11ict. The 
' ' 
affidavits submitted to the Court of Appeals document the 
possibility of severe stress only in the Houston Independent 
School District. 8 Affidavits submitted by the applic~-nts indi-
cate, however, that many school districts are prepared to 
accept the undocumented children .and do not foresee that 
their assimilation will unduly strain their abilites to provide 
a customary education to all their pupils. 
. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the hrlance of 
harms weighs heavily on the side of the children, certainly in 
those school districts where the ability of the local schools · to 
provide education will not be threatened. I therefore will 
vacate the stay instituted by the Court of Appeals, which 
applies to all school districts within Texas. This order shall 
be without prejudice to the ability of an individual school 
. district, or the State on its behalf, to apply for a stay of the 
District Court's injunction. If the district can demonstrate 
that, because of the number of undocumented alien cp.ildren 
within its jurisdiction or because of exceptionally limited 
resources, the operation of the injunction would severely haml" 
3 The State argues here that serious difficulties can be exMcted in the 
Dallas a.nd Brownsville school districts as well, 
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per the provision of education to all its students during the 
coming year, the granting of a stay would be justified:1 
4 Applicants indicate that the District Court already Jrns expressed ai 
willingne;s to consider staying it,~ injunction in tho;:;e school districts that 
can demonstrate exceptional difficulty in admitting the children this fall. 
September 4, 1980 
and Unnamed Noncitizen Children 
v. Texas 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
On the basis of the views expressed 
Brennan, Potter, Thurgood and Harry, 
order vacating the stay of the Court of 
case. 
C ~ • -
- This will have the effect of reinstating the 
injunction issued by the District Court subject to the 
qualifications stated in my Chambers opinion. 
The Justices not yet heard from are, I am told, 
various points in their travels. 
There is some urgency, as the public schools in 
Texas already have opened. 
~ dney!!). .Y~ue 
%1<ence Ctf. /tft,"?',a/ue 
SEP 8 ,9eO 
,.,,,-r ~, f--4 Gr-./ 
341,2 ~ 1Jat"e 
~ al/a& 75,225' 
361-10.95 0-----/, 
September 5, 1980 
Justice Lewis~ Powell Jr. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 
Dear Sir 
All honors to you on your wise and just ruling 
on the matter of the education in Texas of children of 
Mexican parents, those who are in the United States illegally, 
although following the first obligat~on to themselves of 
survival and a better existance for their families. 
That children should suf~er from these conditions 
is, from a humanitarian view, repugnent to anyone professing 
a regard and care for the poor, and mostly despised. 
From an economic sense, we stultify ourselves here 
in Texas by consigning these children to a life on the streets 
exposed t :t> all of the evils that abound, where parents are 
obliged to be away from home to earn a meager living. The 
cost to society would be far greater, than the cost of educating 
these children and giving tham a chance to compete in the 
employment market. 
We in the United States are blind to the absolute 
necessity of better relations with Mexico, and the contempt 
of the people who rule Mexico, is sharply in focus, witness 
Remr-tR:K.S 
the Meiican President's peamrks on his recent visit to Cuba. 
Be charitable on my spelling, I am 75 and get my 
thinking ahead of my 2 finger typing sys tem. 
Hang in there, Judge, and I hope and pray you 
deliver the message to your associates, if it comes to that. 
i! Sin~ ~~ 
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HISD's 
reaction: 
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rustees and la.w-
• er s, Tarrant 
•'cndley, Houston 
c hool ' board 
1resldent, said, 
'We are going to 
1phold the law. 
\le'll treat Ulegal 
llen8 the same as 
ther kids." 
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Texas had been approved. "We are going to uphold the ,1,, .An HISD surve Y th Is week "I think we ought to close the •, -,, ._, education of illegal alien children. 
The Texas attorney general's office law," Tarrant Fendley, Houston . : : . showed there is room for 3,000 more damn border," Fendley said. "But .. , School officials across the state a1·e 
had asked the appeals court to delay the school board president, said after a _· \!, ' · students In 21 predominantly HI- , .. uncertain of the num'.bers of Illegal alien 
Implementation of a federal judge's rnl closed meeting with trustees and spanic schools. . .Please see HISD/page l_liA _. •\ 
Ing which would have allowed undocu/ · _____________________ Please·sce Free/page 15A 
'·\ 
Powell's- .. 
' ' 
:,,i. 'ruling: : ' 
· · In his rulf;g 
Justice Lewi s 
Powell wrote: 
'"Undocumented 
alien children 
have not bee n 
able to att end 
Texas pu hllr 
schools since tho 
challenged st:i't: 
ute was enarted In 
1975. The harm 
caused these chll-
d ren by lack of 
education needs 
little clu old a-
tlon." ,·, 
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IIIS D to . Begin· ~~~()iling·':;:iiI;g~f ~11eiis itf!l 
• • ••. _;: • • '' . /, ')" -'_•·•• i., ! • • _I, , ,; ,t ••• _I l .. • • 1 '• • •~>\• •,: .·• .:'' ·•• t{,i'?fl-
( F 1 ) ship to U.S. District Judge Woodrow ·, all districts with the agency's inter- • Powell's ruling: ··. - r:.f":: rom page -~ _,; + Seals, as suggested In Powe~l's 1' pretatlon of Powell's order. ~•We'll l · .. , Local attorney Isaias Torres ca!l:.";-
't . · opinion. \ · 1; , ~;. ', />f l tell them If. they enroll Illegal ~liens,"½ 1 Ct ed it "a long shot. We thought ~E!"l, 
Powell just opened It further." . While area school ·officials were \· '/..~ we'll pay for them;" he said;-.:,; : .• • ..,, .! ._., had a slim chance." :· , •· : ,, )- • :1 
Henry Wheeler, superintendent making hasty preparations for ac- ., TEA estlm~tes the open admis- . He was critical of the manner 'in :o 
for the Spring Branch Independent ceptlng new students Friday; two ·. · •slon practice will ·cost-the state $800 which undocumented children were 
School District, said his schools also weeks after the start of d ~·sses, S \J.'. per new pup!! enrollefand the local':; l\ abruptly excluded from Houston ,·~ 
will open to Illegal aliens Friday. · Texas Attorney General Mark White :, . district another $800 per student, he · · schools when the adverse ruling was'!-~ 
About 30 had registered prior to the r said his office will handle "with d~- ·, " ·,. said, . adding that .the g~eatest Im- ·. · . received from the 5th Circuit. , f '. ' :? 
. stay, he said, adding that the ··par- ., patch" any complaints of. hardship '. · '. · pact Is expected In districts along ·· ·, "Parents were astounded by' the ' 
ents of those children probably will from Individual districts. . ·~ ·' '· ·· · ' the Rio Grande. · . .. : . . · . wi , ', .,-. way they were immediately cut oW-• 
be contacted Monday If the children · . White said he thought Powell was ,
1
;:, ·t , , However, Peter Schey, lead ~ttor,;, i,t,;. from school. They could have done ;,; 
have'not appeared at school. , . . .. trying to be "abundantly fair with .;, 
1
t;i ~- ney In the lawsuit against the state !;.<i:~r- .it In a way that was not so .abrupt.:~:-
In the Pasadena Independent , J everyone" .In his decision but s~ld_ r/;,:,; of Texas . and. 17 ·sc~ool districts, ,:,;~;,, . There could have been some transl-~.~'.-
School District, which saw about 100 " · he regretted the decision was made . said the plaintiffs are not opposed to . , ,:', . tlon to it . . Some parents. now. are ' 
undocumented children enroll the · , after classes had already begun in .. , , overburdened districts receiving '', ;:, ' hesitant to go back." · .. , 1.' '..; 
first day, attorney Stanley Baskin · .. :, -~ most of the 1,100 school dlst~lcts .I~ _,, ;
1
;;,: ')ndlvidual delays_ frolll Seals. · Seals '1'/i!;~Jt-i ., ·Torres Indicated lawyers.~ inay·~,~ 
said, "I am sure we'll do everything . :' · T~xas. . , ... • •fr<Y: 1 ·!,•i,-i,:,:r~~ _ls expected t~ ·hold a hearln~ this uril; still -have to go to court to get t~c .'~ 
reasonable to enroll them: There .. · , r-t , After reading Powell's elght-page:t:,;j, ,._;·.,. month on, ,a stat~~ _report from t- / Dallas school system to admit me:' -'. 
will be 100 percent cooperation. We .. il:,order, White declared the state Is In .. ·", _school districts. · · _-. ,_.,, . Jri,·,.: t; '#ti'l''r gal aliens. . , · . ·, i _' -:i.'t 
won't defy a court order." ; · · · · ~ · a good position to pursue Its appeal, ,; q~ :J.·!• • "We have no doubt that a--h,ilndfut .· ,-;r· Despite Powell's ruling, Dallai:('J: 
Superintendent• Johnny Clark of · . . which he felt 'the 5th Circuit . will :.ntJ!!. •• of school districts will face· serious ··' ·"'( officials said they will admit ~bf. 
the Goose Creek Independent School . ·. hear In about six months. .. · · · _,,, .,i r. · problems In enrolling the children," . "•' •,. undocumented children unt11 1order~ 
District said he expects 70 illegal ~~,.:. Raymon Bynum, deputy comm!~- ~ -- Schey said from California,., "Y,,eJ, ;J :ed by a Iocal'court. . 1' ,, , ::·, 
aliens to enroll Friday, but the r,ay- \ ~ stoner for program administration ;I':, 
1
, were not oppos1id, to that . 11r;._whenil/1t ~m Dallas has contended that sinc~.U? 
. town district will be hard pressed to ; · and finance with_ the Texas Educa- .. ~, ,,. actual problems rather than grossly \':: , i·• was not Individually named in~,1! 
accept most of them In one school . tlon Agency, said he had not yet · ~ 
1 
1
. exaggerated hypothesized problems ,. 1_; Seals' July 21 order holding state :~. 
heavily damaged by fire last school : · heard of any districts planning to · , -· · appeared from the enrollment of : law unconstitutional, then It mar~ 
year. . seek Individual stays from the court ; undocumented children." · , ·continue past policies. . · ~-,; ' 
Clark said there Is a possibility · :.;.~.::.: order. : .I{~ -· Lawyers for the illegal ·aliens ... :::o·;;;,. But Torres maintained that Seals!~ 
the district would appeal that hard- He said TEA will send a letter to 1 . admitted surprise when hearing of { ruling applied statewide. i 
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Mr. Hargrave: 
Thank you for your most gracious note of September 
It was good to hear from you. -- The influx of 
millions of aliens into our country presents serious 
problems, but I would hope their innocent children will not 
be made to suffer. 
lfp/ss 
.Uli I ~ u 1"" ..,.,. 
125 BROAD STREET 
NEW YORK , N . Y . 10004 
( 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
United States Supreme Court, 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
October 22, 1980 
Re: Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen 
Children v. Texas 
Dear Lewis: 
While in Nantucket this summer, I commented to 
' 
Bill Brennan who was also vacationing there that I thought 
the decision you made on September 4, 1980 in your capacity 
as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Cjrcuit was very appropriate 
inasmuch as there could be no better way of assuring that 
there would be an increase in criminal law violations by 
denying the children of illegal immigrants an opportunity 
for an education. 
I understand that the last paragraph of your 
in-chambers ruling states explicitly that you have not 
reached any decision on the merits of the case, but never-
theless I hope it will turn out eventually that undocumented 
alien children will be able to attend Texas public schools. 
With kind regards and best wishes, I am 
Sine~~ 
Arthur H. Dean 
J, 
~-~ 
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Illegal Aliens Get 1st Schooling ·in Special Classes At the Cromack Elementary School, . after moving in with an aunt and uncle Blanca Betancourt teaches eight pupils, here. · · 
from age 9 to 13, in the special program. All the children are from families with 
Her classroom is reminiscent of a one- Incomes below the Federal poverty line. 
room schoolhouse. A girl who normally Their only experience with English 
would be in the second grade sits in front comes In class, ,unless they follow the 
BROWNSVILLE, Tex., March 18 (AP) 
• UnUI two months ago, 9-year-old Julio 
ld never held R pencil, U800 8Cl8801'8 or 
1t at a desk, He still has trouble writing, 
1ttlng paper an~ speaking English. 
Julio Is , one of 750 children of Illegal 
liens who are enrolled In local schools 
,r the first time this year under a Fed-
·al judge's order. Some, like JUllo, had 
iver been to school, even In Mexico. 
Before his famlly moved to this border 
ty six months ago,·he worked on a ranch 
,lng odd Jobs. The nearest school was 
I 
JrS: 
more than 10 miles away In Matamoros, 
by often lmpa11sable roads . 
Julio and 26 other youngsters are in a 
special · program for children who lack 
basic skills in either English or Spanish. , 
Problems Encountered Early 
"These youngsters at first went Into 
regular bilingual classrooms, but prob-
lems emerged very clearly when teach-
ers found the children had no skills," said 
Cesar Cisneros, director of elementary 
education for the Brownsville Independ-
ent School District. "You can Imagine the 
frustrations of teachers tryln~ to conduct 
a regulnr class when there s one who 
can't hold a pencil." • 
Texas law prohibited free schooling for 
illegal aliens before a Federal judge 
struck down the' statute as unconstitu-
tfonal in July 1980. 
The Brownsville district set up special 
classes in January at three elemen,tary 
schools and it plans to start the program 
in two more schools when teachers are 
available. Most illegal aliens entering, 
school fo, the first time are in regular, 
bilingual classrooms. . , . 
of a boy whose peers are in the seventh. . t~a~her's orders to watch American tele-. 
. · v1s1on programs. · 
Difficulties With Age Ran~e Miss Betancourt uses English as often 
"It's unbeliev~ble what can happen as possible for Instruction but frequently -
when a child doesn't get an education/' switches to Spanish to make herself· un-
she. said. "I never realized there were derstood. However, these children with 
children with no schooling at all." . little or no schooling often lack even & · 
. The wid~ age range causes difficUlties; basic Spanish vocabUlary. ; .. · · , · 
some children are sophisticated beyond "I must teach them the Spanish word 
their years, like one 13-year-old boy who so they will know what I mean when I tell 
worked as a street \'.endor after his par- them the word in English " the teacher 
ents died. He enrolled in local schools said. • · 
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When your style's e 
I • j ~ ' .. 7;) ' • I ~.. • , ~ . t • . . : ":. I I~ ' • ' : .~ ; ! 
ervescent, here's how;~~ the competitimL ,:'· ·,· 
When your sense of style has a sense of fun: the one shoulder, , 
wave print maillot suit in'green/blue or lilac/ magenta; or the 
plunged front maillot, color spliced in purple and black. Each.' -
$28. In sizes 5-13. By Dunkers. Junior Swimwear, (D.219) 4th Floor 
Herald Square and the Mbcy's ·near you. To order, write or phone. 
In NY: .971-6000. For convenience, use your Macy's charge. Or, ·1 
Macy's welcomes the Americc;m Express® Card. , 
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Instructional materials 1Dciu<1e tlrst· 
grade-level fiash cards and a lot of Im• 
provls.ation. The setting Is similar at · 
Egly Elementary School, not far away. 
Betty Frausto has seven students, from 
age 10 to 13, Including two who ha'd never · 
been to school. 1 . • - · 
One of Mrs. Frausto's students, Oscar, 
lived in Brownsville for three years with. 
out going to school. He had been in a 
Matamoros .school before moving t~ the 
United States. . .i · · , _.: . 
"I woUld go with a friend all the time 
and try to find a Job," the 13-year-old said 
in Spanish .. "But they would tell me I was 
too young and needed an education." Un-• 
able to enroll here because of the state 
·law, he stayed at home. · · ' 
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